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HITTING THE MARK: STRICT LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE HANDGUN DESIGN
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty percent of all homicides committed in the United States
each year involve handguns.1 These deadly weapons also play an'
important role in other crimes such as robbery and assault. Further
deaths may occur if handguns are improperly handled and stored.'
Incidents of this nature are especially distressing because they often
may involve children. The handguns involved in a majority of deaths
and injuries have five common characteristics: (1) low cost, (2) short
barrel (easy concealment), (3) small caliber, (4) easy availability, and
(5) deadly force. The combination of these characteristics makes
handguns extremely dangerous products.
Under present strict liability principles, manufacturers are lia-
ble for the injuries their products cause when placed on the market
in a defective condition.' A defective condition may occur either in
the manufacturing of the product or in its design." If a defect in
manufacturing causes an injury, for example when the barrel of a
handgun explodes harming the user, the handgun manufacturer will
be liable. Handgun manufacturers have not yet been held liable
however, for those deaths and injuries involving handguns which
were marketed to the general public without warnings or safety de-
vices, even though handguns are designed to embody deadly force.
Handguns have failed to meet two tests that have traditionally
© 1984 by Michael Dillon.
1. Between 1976 and 1980, this amounted to 95,803 deaths. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, Final Report, 11-13 (1981).
2. As there is no statistical differentiation given between handguns and firearms in most
analyses, the exact number of accidental handgun deaths is not known. But, for the period
1976 to 1979, there were 7,641 accidental firearm deaths in the U.S. It is safe to assume that,
as with murders, the greatest percentage of those deaths were attributable to handguns. P.
SHIELDS, GUNS DON'T DIE-PEOPLE Do, 175 (1980).
3. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
4. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417-18, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 228 (1978) (although a defect in warning is often categorized as a separate type of
defect, in this comment it is analyzed as a defect due to the inadequate design of a product's
warning).
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defined strict liability in this area. The first test is that no liability
attaches to products that are inherently dangerous and cannot be
made safer. 5 The second test is that liability can attach only to prod-
ucts that are dangerous beyond the contemplation of the ordinary
consumer.' Because people expect and assume that handguns must
be designed to embody deadly force, handgun manufacturers have
not been held liable for the death and injury inherent in current
handgun design.
This comment will initially examine the judicial evolution of
strict liability in California. The barriers to this liability will be ex-
plored as well as possible methods to overcome them. Utilizing the
standards announced in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 7 this com-
ment will then demonstrate four types of design defects for which
handgun manufacturers may be liable. Finally, the defenses availa-
ble under strict liability will be analyzed to determine the feasibility
of their use by handgun manufacturers in design defect actions.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
In 1957, Mr. Greenman, while using a combination power tool
as a lathe, was injured when the wood he was turning suddenly flew
out of the machine and struck him in the head. With that blow fell
not only Mr. Greenman, but also "the citadel" of implied warranty.'
Following the requirements for recovery set forth in previous cases,
Mr. Greenman asserted both warranty and negligence causes of ac-
tion as the bases for his recovery. This, however, presented the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court with a dilemma because Mr. Greenman had
given late notice to the manufacturer, thus defeating his warranty
claim. The court resolved this problem by removing all remaining
vestiges of contract law and finally recognizing the need "to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market, rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves." Therefore, the court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being."10 Under this standard, Mr.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
6. Id. at 402A comment g.
7. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
8. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 9 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960).
9. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
10. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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Greenman was only required to show that he used the product in a
reasonably foreseeable or intended manner and that the product em-
bodied a defect that proximately caused his injury." Lack of notice
and contract disclaimers would no longer allow the manufacturers of
defective products to escape liability." In addition, Greenman eased
the statute of limitations so that it would run from the time of injury,
rather than from the time of the product's sale.' The most impor-
tant effect of this decision, though, was the elimination of the privity
requirement. After Greenman, it was no longer necessary to have a
specific contract relation with the manufacturer in order to recover
against him.'
In a series of cases following Greenman, the strict liability ac-
tion was reformulated and expanded to hold retailers, wholesalers,
and distributors liable." The boundaries of liability were further ex-
tended in Elmore v. American Motors Corp.'" to allow recovery on
behalf of injured third parties. In that decision the court emphasized
that bystanders do not have the same opportunity to inspect products
for defects or to purchase them from reputable manufacturers as
consumers do. Thus, the bystander "should be entitled to greater
protection than the consumer or user [when] injury to bystanders
from the defect is reasonably foreseeable."'"
The decisions following Greenman assumed that the test used
in Greenman to determine a defective condition was similar to the
test found in the Restatement. The latter test requires that the prod-
uct be "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer."' 8 In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.," however, the
court rejected that contention. The court based its decision on its fear
that a bifurcated standard requiring the plaintiff to prove both the
presence of a defect and its unreasonable danger would burden "the
injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of negli-
gence.""0 This test, the court concluded, would place a greater bur-
11. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
12. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
13. A. WEINSTEIN, A. TWERSKI, H. PIEHLER, W. DONAHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT 16 (1978).
14. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
15. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 252-53, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306,
321 (1968) (wholesalers and distributers); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. App. 2d
256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 900 (1964) (retailers).
16. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
17. Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
18. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at 347.
19. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
20. 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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den on the plaintiff than that prescribed in Greenman. Therefore,
the court dismissed the requirement that in order to be liable for a
defective condition a product must be in an unreasonably dangerous
condition outside the expectations of the ordinary consumer."1
Nevertheless, the court left unaddressed the question of what
constitutes a defect. Guidance was provided only in a footnote in
which the justices stated that a "cluster of useful precedents" could
supply a standard." The variety of tests applied by the lower courts,
as well as the widespread dissatisfaction with Cronin, led the court
in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co."3 to provide a more substantial
definition of the term "defect."
In Barker, the plaintiff was operating a forklift to raise a load
of lumber. As it was raising the lumber, the forklift began to tip. At
that time, the plaintiff attempted to jump from the lift and was
struck by a piece of falling lumber. The plaintiff asserted that the
lack of seatbelts, rollbar, and outriggers to compensate for instability
constituted a cause of action for a defect in design. At trial, a verdict
for the defendant was returned after the trial court instructed the
jury that liability for a defect in design must be based on a finding
that the product was "unreasonably dangerous" for its intended use.
The California Supreme Court, reversing the decision, refused
"to permit the low esteem in which the public might hold a danger-
ous product to diminish the manufacturer's responsibility for injuries
caused by the product" and emphasized that Cronin had rejected
any "unreasonably dangerous" requirement.24 The court also recog-
nized that a defect in manufacturing is much more apparent than a
defect in design. This is because a manufacturing defect becomes evi-
dent when the product in question is compared with other similar
products. In a design context, however, the application of a devia-
tion-from-the-norm test will not identify the defect "since by defini-
tion the plans and all such units will reflect the same design."25
In providing a paradigm for the identification of a design defect,
the court employed two alternative tests for use in subjecting a man-
ufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries. The first test pro-
vides recovery for the plaintiff if he or she can demonstrate that "the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable man-
21. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
22. Id. at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
23. 20 Cal. 3d at 429, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (1978).
24. Id. at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
25. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
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ner." 6 Under the second alternative test, "a product may be found
defective in design "if through hindsight the jury determines that the
product's design embodies excessive preventable danger, or, in other
words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the chal-
lenged design outweighs the benefits of such design." 27 To further
aid the jury in evaluating the utility of the challenged design, the
court listed as relevant factors to be considered:
[Tihe gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasi-
bility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an im-
proved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and
to the consumer that would result from an alternative design.2"
Because of the Barker decision, once a plaintiff establishes that
he was proximately injured by the design of the defendant's product,
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove "in light of the
relevant factors, that the product is not defective."2 The court's ra-
tionale for this shift is that the manufacturer has better control and
knowledge of the technical aspects of the product.30 By placing the
burden of proof on the manufacturer, the plaintiff is thus relieved of
many of the evidentiary burdens which are presented in a negligence
cause of action.
The standards enunciated in Barker may provide the basis for a
cause of action against handgun manufacturers for designing their
products to embody deadly force. A cause of action against handgun
manufacturers will fulfill the policies on which strict liability was
founded. If a handgun manufacturer is held liable, it will: (1) pro-
vide a strong economic incentive to improve handgun safety, (2)
serve to spread the risk of loss among all handgun purchasers
through increased handgun prices, (3) relieve the plaintiff of many
of the burdens involved in a negligence cause of action, and (4) com-
pensate the injured handgun victim."'
26. Id. (Despite the Barker court's rejection of the Restatement's "unreasonably danger-
ous" formulation it appears that the consumer expectations standard announced by the court
originated from comment i, § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORwS).
27. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
28. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681,
686-92 (1980).
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III. THE UNAVOIDABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCT AS A BARRIER
TO HANDGUN LIABILITY
It has generally been assumed that some products are "inher-
ently dangerous" or "unavoidably unsafe." The manufacturers of
such products have not been held liable for the harm their products
create. Thus, liquor manufacturers have not been held liable for in-
juries stemming from the inherently dangerous nature of their prod-
ucts, such as death and injury caused by drunken driving and alco-
holism. Knives, automobiles, and cigarettes"3 are also included in this
category of products. To insure that the manufacturers of these
products do not "become automatically responsible for all the harm
that such things do in the world,""3 the Second Restatement of Torts
requires the product to be "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer before the manufacturer can be
held liable.""4
Handguns are often included among the aforementioned prod-
ucts because it is assumed that a product whose norm is the infliction
of injury or death cannot be made safer. It does not follow, though,
that the hazards inherent in handguns should preclude liability. "If a
product is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is ironic to
exempt the manufacturer from liability on the ground that any other
sample of his product would produce like harm. If we scrutinize de-
viations from a norm of safety as a basis for imposing liability,
should we not scrutinize all the more the product whose norm is
danger?""8 The crux of the analysis, moreover, should not be on
how dangerous the article is but, rather, on how safe it can be
designed. Former Chief Justice Traynor made clear that some ge-
neric dangerous qualities may be unnecessary:
The cancer producing qualities of cigarettes are generic only in
the sense that all cigarettes have those qualities but they are
neither produced nor consumed for that reason. They may be
likened to the matches of the 19th century whose phosphorous
32. See Hudson v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Ross V.
Phillip Morris Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (no liability in any of these decisions because
the defendant could not have known of the danger at the time of sale); Lartique v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). But
see Pritchard v. Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (a 2-1 decision
which found an implied warranty to the consumer that cigarettes are safe to smoke).
33. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J., 23
(1966).
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at 347.
35. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1965).
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fumes entered the body through cavities in teeth and caused ne-
crosis of the liver, or poisoned the air that people inhaled. With
the development of the safety match these dangers were elimi-
nated. The harm-producing qualities of cigarettes may be no
more generic than the harm-producing qualities of pre-safety
matches.8"
With the advent of low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes, it appears
that Justice Traynor's prediction may soon become true.
A comparison between the evolution of handguns and
automobiles further demonstrates the concept that some generic dan-
gerous qualities are unnecessary. Automobiles have often been con-
sidered unavoidably unsafe products due to their mass, speed, obvi-
ous utility, and the skill needed to operate them. Yet, since
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,3 7 the burden has been placed on
the manufacturer, through both legislation and judicial action, to im-
prove the safety of automobiles. Automobile manufacturers have re-
sponded to this challenge by providing shatterproof glass, four-wheel
brakes, non-vulnerable fuel tanks, and collapsible steering columns.
Indeed, a sobriety-based ignition test may be commonplace on all
automobiles in the near future. By comparison, during this same pe-
riod, the only protective device developed for handguns has been the
"safety." This is a switch that prevents the trigger from being pul-
led. Its effect as a safety device is severely limited, however, because
it can be easily released by a small child or through careless
handling.
Additional reasons for holding handgun manufacturers strictly
liable are present when handguns are distinguished from other ac-
knowledged unavoidably unsafe products. With products such as cig-
arettes and whiskey, for example, the exposure to the dangers in-
volved are by choice and largely confined to the user. In contrast, the
danger in handguns is usually to third parties who have no choice in
accepting the dangerous risks of the product.
Handguns can also be distinguished from other potentially
harmful products based on their respective social utilities. For exam-
ple, knives have a utility because they are a necessary tool. Similarly,
automobiles are a great benefit to society for purposes of transporta-
tion and recreation. Most handguns, however, are of little value to
society. They are too small for effective use in hunting and target
36. Id. at 320-21.
37. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (action for injuries caused by a defective
wheel-the first decision to allow a cause of action for negligence against a remote
manufacturer).
1984]
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shooting, and their benefit as a method of self-defense is minimal.
Conversely, the burden handguns place on society, in terms of death
and injury, is enormous.3 8
Handguns do not have to be considered unavoidably dangerous
products; it is possible that they can be made safer. Furthermore,
even if handguns are considered unavoidably unsafe, their low social
value should not allow handgun manufacturers to escape liability.
IV. APPLICATION
A. Lethal Force as a Defective Handgun Design
The application of the Barker "ordinary consumer" test pro-
vides the first basis for demonstrating a defect in the design of hand-
guns.89 Under this standard, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
handgun failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.
For example, a plaintiff injured by a handgun may argue that he did
not expect his handgun to be used against him by a criminal. The
plaintiff may also claim that he would not have purchased the hand-
gun had he expected to be injured. If the trier of fact believes that an
ordinary consumer should have expected the gun to be used in this
manner, these arguments will fail. Under this analysis, the manufac-
turer's burden will be easily met because most people realize that
handguns are lethal and that extra care must be taken when storing
and handling them.
The Barker decision, however, established that "the expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer cannot be used as the exclusive yard-
stick for evaluating design defectiveness because [iun many situations
• . . the consumer [will] not know what to expect because he [will]
have no idea how safe the product [can] be made."40 Therefore, even
though the minimum standard of the consumer expectations test is
met, a handgun manufacturer may still be liable under the alternate
Barker standard if it is found that "the risk of danger inherent in the
challenged design outweighs the benefits of such a design." '41 Once
the plaintiff demonstrates that the design of the handgun proxi-
mately caused his injury, the burden of proof shifts to the handgun
38. See infra text accompanying notes 40-49.
39. 20 Cal. 3d at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37.
40. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (quoting Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825, 829 (1973)).
41. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
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manufacturer. The manufacturer must prove that the challenged de-
sign has higher social utility than risk of danger. However, the
plaintiff must still demonstrate that the handgun embodies "excessive
preventable danger" '42 in order to rebut the defendant's evidence.
To establish this danger, the plaintiff may address the factors
provided in Barker."3 First, the plaintiff would demonstrate that the
gravity of the danger posed by the challenged handgun design is ex-
tremely high. This is apparent from the fact that handguns are
designed to be lethal.
A second factor that can be considered in light of Barker is the
high degree of likelihood that the danger involved will occur. Statis-
tics could be used to show that specific handguns are involved in a
disproportionately high number of crimes and deaths.4
The third factor referred to in Barker involves the mechanical
feasibility of a safer alternative design. After the manufacturer has
attempted to show the nonfeasibility or lack of alternative designs,
the plaintiff could rebut that showing by providing evidence, for ex-
ample, of the feasibility of creating non-lethal handguns. One such
handgun is the "Taser," .which shoots a barbed contact into a victim
and temporarily incapacitates him with an electrical current.
Though this design is only effective in close proximities, it must be
remembered that a large portion of handgun deaths and injuries oc-
cur within close distances. Thus, the Taser is an example of a possi-
ble alternative to the current lethal design of handguns."' Other via-
ble options include the use of darts with anesthetic tips or possibly
even rubber bullets." Although injuries might occur with any alter-
native, it can be easily demonstrated that they would not approach
the numbers of those injuries caused by conventional handguns.
The next Barker factor the plaintiff may address is the overall
adverse consequences to the product and the consumer which would
result from the use of an alternative design. The manufacturer may
attempt to assert the high utility of current handgun designs through
42. Id.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
44. For example, the type of handgun used in the attempted assassination of President
Reagan has been shown to have been used in 14% of all handgun crimes even though its share
of the handgun market is only 9%. Lauter, Suits Target Handgun Makers, 5 NAT. L.J. 1, 12
(1982).
45. See People v. Heffner, 70 Cal. App. 3d 643, 139 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1977) (in which the
Taser was held to be a firearm for purposes of CAL. PEN. CODE § 12031(a), which makes it a
misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in public).
46. See Task Force Report: Science and Technology, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALY-
sEs, 15 (1967).
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their use in hunting and target shooting, as collectors items, and for
purposes of self-defense. These uses, however, are rebuttable by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff may successfully demonstrate that most
hunters rely on high-powered rifles and shotguns, rather than hand-
guns. The reason hunters use rifles and shotguns is because they
have greater range, power, and accuracy than handguns.47 The
problem of accuracy also makes handguns less desirable for target
shooting because an increase in the length of the barrel provides a
proportionate increase in accuracy.' The handguns involved in most
design defect suits will most likely have short barrels, because this
feature makes them easily concealable and therefore attractive to
criminals. This short barrel, however, is unsuitable for target shoot-
ing except at very close ranges. Finally, the fact that these handguns
are inexpensive, in great supply, and usually of poor quality makes
them undesirable as collector's items.' 9
The manufacturer's alternate claim that handguns are valuable
for purposes of self-defense may be controverted by a demonstration
of the inadequacy of handguns as a method of protection. For exam-
ple, the majority of burglaries occur while no one is at home; conse-
quently, handguns are ineffective in stopping the majority of home
burglaries. In addition, it is of little value to have a handgun if it is
likely to be stolen while the owner is absent.5" Finally, for a hand-
gun to be effective in protecting one's person, it must be kept loaded
and in close proximity to its owner. Even with this preparedness, the
criminal still has the advantage of surprise. Indeed, the presence of a
handgun in the hands of a victim may provoke the aggressor to im-
mediate violence.
Perhaps the most effective argument a plaintiff can make in a
strict liability action against a handgun manufacturer is to illustrate
that alternative designs would be just as effective for protection. For
example, a handgun that fires rubber bullets may be shown to repel
assailants as successfully as conventional handguns.
The last factor in Barker which the plaintiff may have to ad-
dress is the cost involved in the alternative design. Manufacturers
may claim that the expense in changing the design would be too
47. P. SHIELDS, supra note 2, at 45-46.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 42, 46.
50. It has been estimated that between 65,000 and 225,000 handguns are stolen each
year. TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 1, at 32 (citing Mark H. Moore, "Keep-
ing Handguns from Criminal Offenders," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, at 100 (1981)).
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high. However, the manufacturers' arguments may be successfully
refuted in one of two ways. First, they can be refuted by showing
that the expense of the alternative is less than the costs attributable
to the design of the handgun at issue. Secondly, even if the cost of the
safety remedies is so great that the product becomes too expensive to
produce, it does not preclude the possibility that liability may be im-
posed. This was alluded to in Barker when the court noted:
In the instant case we have no occasion to determine whether a
product which entails a substantial risk of harm may be found
defective even if no safer alternative design is feasible. As we
noted in Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. [citations omitted]
Justice Traynor has suggested that liability might be.imposed as
'to products whose norm is danger. '
Several appellate decisions have also cited Justice Traynor's com-
ments. 52 Thus, there is potential merit in the argument that some
products, such as handguns, are of such minimal value to society that
the manufacturers of those products should be held liable regardless
of whether their product can be made safer.
B. Defects in Design Due to Inadequate Safety Devices
Handgun manufacturers may also be held liable for the defec-
tive design of specific features of a handgun, such as the lack of ade-
quate safety devices. If the handgun as a whole is not considered to
be defectively designed, surely it is rendered so by the absence of an
effective safety device. 8 This cause of action was first established
when the court in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.54 held that a "prod-
uct without necessary safety devices may be found defective."" 5 In
reversing a summary judgment, the Pike court stated that it was for
the trier of fact to consider whether a bulldozer was defective be-
51. 20 Cal. 3d at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.10 (quoting
Traynor, supra note 34, at 367 et seq.).
52. See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482 P.2d 681, 684, 93
Cal. Rptr. 769, 772 (1971); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510,
517, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1973); Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 372,
381, 154 Cal. Rptr. 122, 128 (1979).
53. A manufacturer has suggested that a handgun is safe provided the owner takes the
basic "safety precaution" of removing a bullet and keeping the hammer over that empty cham-
ber to prevent accidental discharge. Lauter, supra note 43, at 12.
54. 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
55. Id. at 476-77, 467 P.2d at 237, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 637. See also Garcia v. Halsett, 3
Cal. App. 3d 319, 323, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 422 (1970) (washing machine found to be defective
as it lacked an inexpensive safety device that would have prevented the machine from spinning
while the door was open).
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cause it was manufactured without rear view mirrors. The addition
of these mirrors would have eliminated a forty-eight foot blind spot
behind the machine and would have enabled its operator to see the
plaintiff before he backed into him.
In a later case, Buccery v. General Motors,56 a manufacturer of
a small truck was held responsible for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff which could have been prevented if the truck had been
designed with headrests. The court emphasized that "any product so
designed that it causes injury when used or misused in a foreseeable
fashion is defective if the design feature which caused the injury cre-
ated a danger which was readily preventable through the employ-
ment of existing technology at a cost consonant with the economical
use of the product. '67
The fact that a handgun is by its very nature unsafe, should not
diminish the need for safety devices, but rather increase it. This is
especially true when someone is involved who, because of inexperi-
ence or young age, does not understand the dangerous nature of
products like handguns. Thus, in Titus v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., the
manufacturer of an oil derrick was held liable when it was demon-
strated that the addition of a metal safety guard would have pre-
vented the injuries to a child crushed while "riding" the derrick.58
The aforementioned decisions, while decided before Barker,
utilize similar considerations. As a result, in the case of a child in-
jured while playing with a handgun, the plaintiff may demonstrate
that a handgun designed without adequate safety devices creates a
high degree of danger. This is true not only because of the hand-
gun's highly lethal nature, but also because of its ease of operation.
The plaintiff may also use statistics showing the number of child
deaths attributable to handgun mishandling. In using the statistics, it
would not be necessary to show a large number of prior child deaths
to hold a manufacturer liable because low-cost alternative designs
and devices are available which could have prevented the deaths. For
example, trigger locks, which prevent a handgun from being fired
unless it is first unlocked, are currently available for a nominal price.
Such locks are sold separately from handguns, but the plaintiff may
demonstrate how easily they could be incorporated into existing
56. 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976).
57. Id. at 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
58. 91 Cal. App. 3d 372, 154 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1979) (noteworthy in this respect is the
testimony of the child's mother who, when asked why she did not warn the child of the dan-
gers involved in playing on the derrick, responded that she recognized such an activity as




Additionally, the plaintiff may argue that as the number of
handguns increases, more of them will be placed in the hands of
inexperienced owners who do not properly store the weapons out of
the reach of children." These handguns are very attractive to chil-
dren particularly because of their prevalence in the media. There-
fore, the manufacturer should arguably foresee that the number of
accidental child deaths attributable to handguns will continue to
increase.
It is clear that these deaths could be prevented at a low cost to
the handgun manufacturer by incorporating safety devices into cur-
rent handgun designs. Indeed, it seems anomalous that we keep curi-
ous children out of aspirin bottles by the use of child-proof caps but
do not require similar precautions with handguns.
C. Design Defects in the Promotion and Distribution of Hand-
guns
When a dangerous product is placed into the hands of the gen-
eral public, it is inevitable that some ill-trained, incompetent, or irre-
sponsible persons will misuse the product. As a result, the manufac-
turer who allows this dangerous product to be openly distributed and
promoted should be held strictly liable for any injuries the product
creates. To determine those to whom the dangerous product must be
denied, it is first necessary to determine the foreseeable misuses of
the product. The court of appeals addressed this issue in Dosier v.
Wilcox-Crittendon Co.6
In Dosier, an airline mechanic was injured when a "snaphook"
broke while being used to lift a counterweight. Because the hook was
designed and marketed for use with livestock, the court held that the
manufacturer could not be expected to foresee the plaintiff's misuse
of the product. Therefore, the manufacturer was not liable for failing
to warn the plaintiff of the "snaphook's" lifting capacity. In its hold-
ing, the court emphasized that "the market for which [the product] is
produced is a most important consideration" in determining whether
59. This analysis may also be used to demonstrate the feasibility of transparent cham-
bers or other devices to alert the person cleaning a handgun to the presence of a bullet. These
devices might simultaneously eliminate the element of chance in "Russian Roulette" and pre-
vent the deaths which that game creates.
60. The U.S. Dept. of the Treasury has reported that 2.4 million handguns were pro-
duced in the U.S. in 1980, excluding those for military use. P. SHIELDS, supra note 2, at 177.
61. 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 119 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1975).
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the product is being used in an intended or foreseeable manner.6 2
The court based its rationale on the cost-spreading policy of strict
liability announced in Greenman. The court reasoned that if the
manufacturer is to know where to distribute those costs they must be
able to identify and anticipate their market.
Additional support for the theory of a defect in the design and
promotion of a product may be gained from Hyman v. Gordon." In
that decision, the plaintiff kicked over a gasoline-filled can of paint
brushes which was located on the floor of his garage. The gasoline
flowed into the pilot light of a water heater creating a fire which
burned the plaintiff. The court held that it was for the trier of fact to
determine "whether the presence of the water heater in the garage
location constituted a defective design; and the foreseeability of harm
resulting therefrom." ' Thus, even though the water heater func-
tioned as intended, the builder could be held strictly liable for plac-
ing it in an unfavorable location.
As can be readily seen, "strict liability focuses on the reasona-
bleness of the product in the environment of its use."6 5 Therefore, an
injured handgun victim may effectively argue that "[i]t is possible
that a [handgun] may function safely in one location in the design
but not another.""" For example, if handguns were marketed and
distributed solely to police officers, they would probably not be found
defective.6" This is because police officers are trained to properly
handle and store their weapons. Required target practice, for most
officers, serves to further familiarize the police officer with the dan-
gers of handguns and the ways to avoid their hazards.
The majority of handguns, however, are distributed to the gen-
eral public. They are sold not only in firearm shops, but also in
sporting goods stores and flea markets. In addition, parts and acces-
sories for these handguns are readily available by mail. These hand-
guns are promoted in mass circulation magazines such as Shooting
Times, and Guns and Ammo, by firearm organizations and lobbies,
and more subtly on television. In this context, it is apparent that
handgun manufacturers should foresee that many persons to whom
their product is distributed will use it for criminal purposes. Fur-
62. Id. at 78, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
63. 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973).
64. Id. at 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
65. A. Weinstein, supra note 12, at 9.
66. 35 Cal. App. 3d at 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 264.




thermore, with the present increase in handgun sales, manufacturers
should also expect that a substantial number of their customers are
first time handgun owners who have had no instruction in proper
handgun use. This lack of training creates an increased danger of
accidental death or injury through mishandling.
This foreseeable defect in distribution should be used to restrict
the distribution and promotion of handguns to the public in a man-
ner similar to the way we restrict other dangerous products such as
explosives and certain chemicals. At the very minimum, it should be
utilized to hold handgun manufacturers liable unless they provide
proper instruction and training in the use of their product. We
should require at least the same instruction and training for a prod-
uct that is lethal as we do for a mere disabling weapon, such as
mace.
D. Inadequate Warning as a Defective Handgun Design
Similar to the defect in promotion is the defect due to the inade-
quacy or lack of warning regarding a product's dangerous propensi-
ties. Such a defect was first established in Canifax v. Hercules Pow-
der Co.,68 in which the court recognized that a product, although
free from manufacturing or design defects, may nonetheless become
defective "if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the
hands of a user without a suitable warning and the product is sup-
plied and no warning is given." 9 Thus, there was a triable issue of
fact present as to whether a retailer was liable for selling dynamite
fuses without providing warnings as to their rate of burn. The faster
burn rate of the fuses sold to the plaintiff caused his injuries when
they detonated the dynamite sooner than the plaintiff expected.
In the subsequent case of Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co.,70
the Canifax standard was held not to be affected by the Cronin
court's decision rejecting the unreasonably dangerous formulation. In
a footnote, the court states that the warning defect actually extends
liability beyond the perimeters of Greenman." Therefore, the un-
reasonably dangerous standard was necessary to make certain that
the manufacturer did not become the insurer of his product.
68. 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
69. Id. at 53, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 558. (Liability has also been applied to products with
inadequate assembly instructions which cause injury. Midgley v. S. S. Cresege Co., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1976)).
70. 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 119 Cal. Rptr. 135.
71. Id. at 80-81 n.3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39 n.3.
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In Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc.,7 2 the court resolved
this issue when it rejected the use of the unreasonably dangerous
formulation. The court, however, affirmed the lower court's instruc-
tion that a warning defect could not be found unless the absence of
any adequate warning rendered the product "substantially danger-
ous" to the user. This elevated standard was, the court felt, justified
for otherwise the plaintiff would merely have to prove the absence of
warning made the product "dangerous." Such a formulation would
place too much of a burden on the defendant because "[w]hy else
was the plaintiff injured, a jury would reasonably ask itself, unless
the product was 'dangerous?' ,,7' Therefore, the court held that the
"substantially dangerous" standard "adequately focused the jury's
attention upon the relevant factors in . . .determining whether the
magnitude of the danger inherent in the use of a product was suffi-
ciently great as to require a warning. ' 7 4
Cavers also provided guidance for the determination of a warn-
ing defect. Emphasizing that the conceptual difficulties of this defect
make it even more elusive to define than defects in design, the court
adopted the analysis used in Barker. Thus, in warning defect cases
the focus should be on such considerations as "the normal expecta-
tions of the consumer as to how the product will perform, degrees of
simplicity or complication in the operation or use of the product, the
nature and magnitude of the danger to which the user is exposed, the
likelihood of injury, and the feasibility and beneficial effect of includ-
ing a warning. ' '71
As Barker left open the development of other standards for de-
termining the presence of a defect, the higher standard of Cavers
serves as the present guide in actions for defective product warnings.
This standard must still be viewed in light of the Barker criteria. As
a result, a plaintiff asserting a claim against a handgun manufac-
turer must rely on arguments similar to those made earlier regarding
defects in design. In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate the fea-
sibility and beneficial effect of the warning. This creates a major
problem for the plaintiff. Generally, when the dangerous propensi-
ties of a product are within the reasonable contemplation and knowl-
edge of the consumer, a lack of warning will not constitute a defect.
72. 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979).
73. Id. at 348, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
74. Id. at 350, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50.
75. Id. at 348, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 148. See also Barth v. B. B. Goodrich Tire Co., 265
Cal. App. 2d at 244-45, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 321; Bojorquez v. House of Toys Inc., 62 Cal. App.
3d 930, 933-34, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484-85 (1976).
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For example, in Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc.,7 a slingshot was
not considered to be defective because it lacked a warning.7
7
This patent-latent distinction has been rejected in both manu-
facturing and design defect actions. 78 Arguably it should also be
eliminated from the concept of a defect in warning. Former Chief
Justice Traynor enunciated this point nineteen years ago when he
said:
Moreover, there are no warnings on cigarette packages of a sort
to bring home the gravity of the risk. Important though it may
be to scrutinize one man's meat for signs of non-conforming
poison, it may more often prove necessary to scrutinize his con-
forming poison for signs of warning as to its use and even re-
minders as to its patent risks.
7 9
As most currently marketed handguns only provide a minimal
warning of their dangerous propensities, a more effective warning
might serve a very beneficial purpose. Such a warning could be used
to "bring home" to the handgun owner the need to keep handguns
safely out of the reach of children, or the extra caution needed to
avoid injuries caused by mishandling. Although people realize hand-
guns are dangerous, they nonetheless treat them in careless ways.8"
Perhaps this is due to our frontier history or the great exposure
handguns are given in the media. In either case, an effective warning
might serve as a constant reminder, such as those legislatively man-
dated for cigarettes, of the consequences of careless use of a handgun.
Since this could be accomplished at a very low cost, handgun manu-
facturers who do not provide an adequate warning should be held
liable for the damages their products cause.
V. THE INADEQUACY OF DEFENSES FOR THE HANDGUN
MANUFACTURER
Under strict liability, the defenses a handgun manufacturer may
assert are limited. Because the focus is on the product and not the
76. 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1976).
77. Id. at 933-34, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85. See also Holmes v. J. C. Penney Co., 133
Cal. App. 3d 216, 220, 183 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1982) (carbon dioxide cartridges used to
power pellet guns not defective when sold to minors without a warning).
78. See Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443, 449 (1972).
79. Traynor, supra note 34, at 371.
80. See Cunningham v. Chandler, (unpublished) (1983) (in which a handgun fell out of
the defendant's pants while he was "mooning" the camera during a family photograph session,
accidentally fired, and injured two persons).
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manufacturer's actions, the reasonable conduct of the manufacturer
will not preclude liability.
The fact that handguns present a patent danger will also not
constitute a defense. This patent-latent distinction was rejected in
Luque v. McLean.81 In that case, a lawnmower manufacturer was
held liable for injuries caused when, during a fall, the plaintiff's
hand went into the unguarded opening of an operating lawnmower.
The court disavowed the notion that the plaintiff was required to
prove he was unaware of the defect, stating:
It would indeed be anomalous to allow a plaintiff to prove that
a manufacturer was negligent in marketing an obviously defec-
tive product, but to preclude him from establishing the manu-
facturer's strict liability for doing the same thing. The result
would be to immunize from strict liability manufacturers who
callously ignore patent dangers in their products while subject-
ing to such liability those who innocently market products with
latent defects.62
The contributory negligence defense would also not be available
to the handgun manufacturer in most jurisdictions. This defense was
highly criticized because it barred recovery for any plaintiff who
contributed to his injuries. Therefore, California adopted the com-
parative approach to negligence in Li. v. Yellow Cab Co.,81 and sub-
sequently, to strict liability in Daly v. General Motors Corp."' The
court's rationale in Daly was based upon the recognition that, under
the contributory approach, assumption of the risk served as a com-
plete defense to products liability. This defense created "the curious
and cynical message . . . that it profits the manufacturer to make his
product so defective that in the event of injury he can argue that the
user had to be aware of its patent defects." '85 Thus, in most jurisdic-
tions, handgun manufacturers will be held liable under comparative
liability for the proportionate share of damages for which the trier of
fact finds them responsible. This is regardless of whether or not the
plaintiff contributed to his injuries.
Handgun manufacturers will also have difficulty arguing that
81. 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
82. Id. at 145, 501 P.2d at 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 449. See also Pike v. Frank Git-
tough Co., 2 Cal. 3d at 473-74, 467 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (the danger of being
struck by a bulldozer was obvious, yet the defendant was still liable for not installing mirrors
to protect against the danger of being run over by the machine).
83. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828-29, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
84. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 387 (1978).
85. Id. at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
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intervening factors, such as mishandling or criminal use of their
products, should sever their liability. Currently, a manufacturer is
required "to foresee some degree of misuse and abuse of his product,
either by the user or by third parties, and to take reasonable precau-
tions to minimize the harm that may result from misuse and
abuse." '86 This misuse may even include those which are "unusual"
or "abnormal. '8 7 How foreseeable that misuse is becomes an issue
for the trier of fact. 8 Therefore, although intervening actions by
criminal third parties are not normally considered foreseeable, when
the product itself is an instrument of a disproportionately high
amount of crimes, the manufacturer should be required to foresee the
misuse.
In the area of automobile liability, the "motor vehicle manufac-
turer is required to foresee that as an incident of normal operation in
the environment in which his product will be used accidents will
occur." 8' As these manufacturers are liable for injuries caused by
unintentional but foreseeable car crashes, should not handgun manu-
facturers be likewise held responsible for similar foreseeable mis-
uses? This is heightened by the fact that it is quite foreseeable that
handguns will be used for criminal purposes due to their low cost
and easy concealability. Indeed, they are already involved in one-half
of the annual homicides committed in the United States. Similarly,
should not the handgun manufacturer be required to foresee deaths
that result from the mishandling of their product when it is sold,
without adequate safety devices, to a largely untrained public? Better
care in the handling and storage of handguns would prevent many of
these injuries, but it is not a solution. Carelessness is commonplace
in society, and when it is combined with a dangerous product, the
potential for harm is increased. Therefore, just as we require the
manufacturer of a dangerous product, such as the automobile, to
foresee and take this carelessness into account in his product's design,
we should also place at least the same duty on the part of the hand-
gun manufacturer.
86. Self. v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579
(1974). See also Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301
(1970).
87. Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 340, 79 Cal. Rptr.
194, 199 (1969) (citing Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. at 36-38).
88. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 78, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
89. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The damage to life and property that handguns create is rising
yearly. Unfortunately, legislative attempts to place controls on hand-
guns have either failed or been circumvented by the general public as
well as by private firearm lobbies.9" Treating the handgun as a "de-
fective product" would effectuate the public policy behind strict lia-
bility which "demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in de-
fective products that reach the market."9"
Handguns are of minimal value to society. Their design makes
them inadequate for hunting, target shooting, or collecting. In addi-
tion, their effectiveness as a method of self-defense is limited. They
are, however, extremely lethal products. Their low cost, easy availa-
bility, and concealability make them a primary instrument of most
crimes as well as one-half of our yearly murders.92 Their ease of
operation and minimal safety devices, when combined with a careless
and untrained public, are the cause of many deaths and injuries.
These deaths and injuries clearly outweigh the few benefits hand-
guns provide.
Holding handgun manufacturers strictly liable for the damages
their products create will force the manufacturer to internalize those
damages into their product's design. For "[t]he design and manufac-
ture of products should not be carried out in an industrial vacuum
but with recognition of the realities of their everyday use."9 This
liability will effectively place the burden on handgun manufacturers
to increase the safety of their product, or in the alternative, to halt
the production of handguns altogether.
Michael Dillon
90. For example, the 1968 Gun Control Act banned, with few exceptions, the importa-
tion of handguns into the United States. However, a loophole in the bill allows handgun parts
to be imported into the United States and then assembled and sold as handguns. 18 U.S.C.
925(d) (1968).
91. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, J. concurring).
92. P. SHELDS, supra note 2, at 30.
93. 8 Cal. 3d at 126, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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